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Résumé : Michael Polanyi et H.M. Collins opposent la connaissance tacite
à la connaissance explicite. Pour Collins, les secrets et les autres formes de
« connaissance tacite relationnelle » sont tacites, mais seulement du fait de
circonstances et de relations humaines spécifiques. Collins traite cette connais-
sance relationnelle comme moins intéressante d’un point de vue théorique que
la connaissance collective qui est par essence difficile, voire peut-être impos-
sible à exprimer par des formulations explicites. Dans cet article, je me focalise
sur la connaissance tacite relationnelle, malgré sa marginalité dans la typologie
de Collins, parce qu’elle permet d’attirer l’attention sur les ambiguïtés concep-
tuelles de la relation entre connaissance tacite et connaissance explicite. Qui
plus est, ces ambiguïtés entrent en jeu, au titre de ressources stratégiques, dans
l’histoire des conflits relatifs au travail et dans les efforts visant à sécuriser et
préserver l’autonomie professionnelle. Au lieu de traiter la connaissance tacite
comme une substance possédée par des individus et des groupes, je suggère
qu’une alternative empirique et sociologique serait d’enquêter sur les utilisa-
tions pragmatiques et polémiques de la distinction tacite/explicite dans des
circonstances particulières d’action et de conflit.
Abstract: Michael Polanyi and H.M. Collins contrast tacit knowledge with
explicit knowledge. For Collins, secrets and other forms of “relational tacit
knowledge” are tacit, but only in relation to specific circumstances and re-
lationships. Collins treats such relational knowledge as less interesting the-
oretically than collective knowledge that is essentially difficult and perhaps
impossible to convey through explicit formulations. In this paper I focus on
relational tacit knowledge, despite its marginality in Collins’s typology, be-
cause it draws attention to conceptual ambiguities in the relationship between
tacit and explicit knowledge. More importantly, such ambiguities come into
play as strategic resources in historical labor conflicts and in efforts to secure
and preserve professional autonomy. Instead of treating tacit knowledge as a
substantive possession of individuals and groups, I suggest that an empirical
Philosophia Scientiæ, 17 (3), 2013, 55–73.
56 Michael Lynch
sociological alternative is to investigate pragmatic and polemical uses of the
tacit/explicit distinction in particular circumstances of action and conflict.
Ever since Michael Polanyi wrote on the subject more than a half-century
ago [Polanyi 1958], tacit knowledge has proved to be one of the most resilient
themes in history, philosophy, and social studies of science. It also has an en-
during place in psychology and cognitive science, and in business and manage-
ment studies, among other fields. Although the most original and provocative
discussions of tacit knowledge were published decades ago, interest in the topic
has remained strong and has intensified recently with the publication of a new
edition of Polanyi’s The Tacit Dimension [Polanyi 2009], Harry Collins’s Tacit
and Explicit Knowledge [Collins 2010], hereafter [TEK], and Mary Jo Nye’s
biography of Polanyi [Nye 2011].
No doubt, there are many reasons for the persistent interest in tacit knowl-
edge. The most obvious reason is that the theme resonates with the discourse
and interests of practitioners as well as scholars (and of scholars as academic
practitioners). Scientists and medical practitioners consistently testify to the
indispensible role in their practices of tacit knowledge, craft knowledge, and
variations on those themes, such as “golden hands”, Fingerspitzen, bedside
manner, and other informal skills gained through on-the-job training rather
than formal education. Scholars in many fields have embraced the theme to
challenge philosophical and historical conceptions of science that use textbook
accounts of method and autobiographical reflections by prominent scientists
as their sole means of access to scientific practice.
Attempts to come to terms with tacit knowledge often contrast it with
what it is not: it is not explicit; it cannot be reduced to rules or formulae;
it cannot be conveyed through written or verbal instructions; and computer
programs cannot replicate it. Nevertheless, as Stephen Turner points out, as-
sertions about tacit knowledge often resort to analogies with explicit rules,
perceptions, and interpretations [Turner 2012]. Polanyi uses such an analogy
when he defines a “skilful performance” as “the observance of a set of rules
which are not known as such to the person following them” [Polanyi 1958,
50]. This analogy with rules appears to be shot through with paradox: the
“rules” are not written or recited; they are not even “known” by the person who
skillfully follows them. To transpose Donald Rumsfeld’s category of “known
unknowns” [Rumsfeld 2005], these tacit rules are “unknown knowns”. There
are, of course, ways around the paradox. Polanyi’s way was to drive a logical
wedge between knowing how to do something and being able to verbalize how
one does it. Depending on one’s disciplinary preference, Polanyi’s tacit rules
can be assigned to the rules of a language, to cognitive organizations and neu-
rological processes, or to a social ideology or “discourse” that is unrecognized or
misrecognized by the docile subjects who act in accord with it [Turner 1994].
Because tacit knowledge is defined as being beyond the reach of rules and
explicit formulations, many analysts (including some laboratory practitioners)
At the Margins of Tacit Knowledge 57
associate tacit knowledge with non-rational domains of luck, magic, super-
stition, and mysticism [Cambrosio & Keating 1988], [Jordan & Lynch 1992],
[Lynch 1985]. However, while he insists that the tacit dimension is essen-
tially “inexpressible”, Polanyi places that dimension squarely in the real world.
Indeed, it is so down-to-earth that rules and generalizations are too abstract
to be able to grasp it. He also endows tacit knowledge with political signifi-
cance, as it is a reality that shatters the dreams of ideologues and the plans of
social engineers. And yet, this reality eludes all efforts to come to terms with
it. At best, it can be mentioned, indicated, or alluded to. For Polanyi tacit
knowledge is not and cannot ever be made explicit. It is not enough to say
that tacit knowledge is unstated but capable of being put into words, should
the need arise and the relevant information and communication technology be
available—it simply cannot be conveyed in words to someone who does not
already “dwell” in the tacit dimension.
Unlike Polanyi, Collins portrays the relationship between tacit and ex-
plicit knowledge as more of a continuum from readily explicable to ever-more-
recondite forms of knowledge [TEK]. His typology is not simply an array of
categories of explicit and tacit knowledge, as the types of tacit knowledge
are ordered in terms of “strength” along a core-periphery axis. Collins dia-
grams “the terrain of tacit knowledge” as a concentric series of circles and
squares [TEK, 158], with the innermost circle representing the “strongest”
type of tacit knowledge, and the outermost (most marginal, weakest) type
representing knowledge that is tacit only as “a matter of how particular people
relate to each other” [TEK, 86]. Such “relational tacit knowledge” lies just
within the margin between tacit and explicit knowledge in Collins’s typology.
This “relational” category includes various types of knowledge that can be
formalized and transmitted by someone who possesses the relevant commu-
nication technology and technical capacity. For example, secrets—knowledge
withheld from some persons or groups but not from others—can be made
explicit, in principle, though there may be very powerful reasons not to re-
veal them in some relational circumstances. Collins makes clear that he finds
“relational tacit knowledge” less interesting, philosophically, than his other
two major categories: “somatic tacit knowledge” (physically embodied skill)
and “collective tacit knowledge” (knowledge embedded in forms of social life).
“Collective tacit knowledge” is his core category [TEK, 158]—“the irreducible
heartland of the concept” [TEK, 119]—whereas “relational”, and to a lesser ex-
tent “somatic”, tacit knowledge is, in principle if not in practice, reducible to
explicit knowledge.
In this paper, I question Collins’s equation of “relational” with “weak” and
uninteresting tacit knowledge. My questioning extends to the very coherence
and reality that Collins attributes to the overall “terrain” of tacit knowledge.
However, I do not mean to suggest that tacit knowledge is unreal. To para-
phrase Ian Hacking’s question about social constructionism [Hacking 1999],
my question is “Real in relation to what?” My argument is that the very no-
tion of tacit knowledge is inseparable from the contingent relations in which
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it is bound. Treating it as a concept—or as part of a “vocabulary” to borrow
C. Wright Mills’ classic account of motives—differs from treating it as a sub-
stantive terrain or a pervasive force [Mills 1940]. As I mentioned earlier, tacit
knowledge often is defined in relation to what it is not: it is not formal (or even
formalizable); it is not explicit; it is not reducible to rules, algorithms, writ-
ten instructions and protocols. Consequently, the “what” of tacit knowledge is
located in relation to “what it is not”. This does not mean that it is unreal,
nor does it mean that it is a kind of epistemic anti-matter or dark matter.
Instead, I mean to suggest that the reality of tacit knowledge is bound up in
uses of language; and, specifically, various conceptions of explicit knowledge
that define what it is not. Far from being uninteresting, its marginal relations
to conceptions of explicit knowledge are crucial for understanding the mean-
ing (the uses) of tacit knowledge—such relations constitute the relevance of
tacit knowledge. Among the various uses of the concept of tacit knowledge are
polemical uses that serve to enhance and defend the autonomy of academic
and non-academic professions. Consequently, my aim in the remainder of this
paper is to examine what is done with the notion of “tacit knowledge” rather
than to define and classify what it is as a substantive domain. I will leave it
to readers to decide if my treatment simply differs from Collins’s or whether
it reveals a basic misconception of the phenomenon on his (or my) part.
In my view, a treatment of tacit knowledge as relational and residual may
lead us to question the very unity and coherence of the “tacit dimension” that
Polanyi postulates, or the “terrain” on which Collins proposes to “map” tacit
knowledge. Moreover, such a treatment can encourage us to focus instead on
particular academic and vernacular uses of the concept as well as other, ar-
guably related, terms. This relational turn is a shift away from philosophical
debate about what can or cannot be made explicit, in principle or in prac-
tice, and toward studies of what counts—and, equally important, what does
not count—as tacit knowledge in specific historical and contemporary circum-
stances. Such research examines explicit claims about tacit knowledge, and
can lead us to explore what such usage hides as well as what it reveals.
When shifting focus from a notion of “terrain”, which suggests a coherent
and substantive ground, to an examination of situated usage, my aim is not
to reduce tacit knowledge to mere words or attributions. I mention this in
light the way Collins, in a book co-authored with Robert Evans, contrasts
“relational theories” with a “substantive” theory of expertise [Collins & Evans
2007, 2]. Collins and Evans elaborate upon this contrast by saying that acquir-
ing expertise involves an arduous social process of learning the knowledge (in-
cluding, especially the tacit knowledge) possessed by an “expert group”. Such
expertise is possessed—as skill—and it can be lost through disuse. Contrary
to “relational theories”, which Collins and Evans argue would treat exper-
tise strictly as a contingent “attribution” made by others, their theory treats
expertise as something that “individuals may or may not possess [...] indepen-
dently of whether others think they possess expertise” [Collins & Evans 2007,
3]. Their dichotomous separation of linguistic “attribution” from substantive
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possession of expertise ignores complex, empirically evident practices and in-
stitutions that define, certify, and test what counts as expertise in particular
professions, games, and other activities performed in specific historical and
cultural circumstances. Importantly, when they theorize about the topic and
attempt to demarcate “real” expertise from non- or pseudo-expertise, Collins
and Evans participate (if only vicariously) in the social practice of constituting
what counts as expertise. The problem with their theorizing is that it is ab-
stracted from the political and professional circumstances in which claims and
counterclaims about expertise are aired, as well as from the activity-specific
procedures and forums that demonstrate and test expertise. The concept of
“attribution” does not do justice to the substantive, and yet highly variable
and situated, organization of such practical tests and professional institutions.
In the remainder of this essay, I will make a similar argument about Collins’s
treatment of tacit knowledge. In contrast to Collins, I shall argue that tacit
knowledge is not simply a real domain or dimension; instead, I shall argue
that tacit knowledge is not a unified “terrain”, but that it takes distinct forms
depending upon local claims and counterclaims about what it is and is not.
Finally, I shall suggest that Collins’s theory is limited by the way he locates
tacit knowledge on an abstract “terrain”, rather than (as some of his own early
work exemplifies) in relation to discursive situations, historical labor conflicts,
and efforts to secure and protect professional autonomy.
1 How to locate tacit knowledge
Theoretical and philosophical writings are by no means the only discur-
sive means for locating (defining, identifying, exhibiting) tacit knowledge.
Numerous practical situations and conundrums are a fertile source of reflection
on how practical and discursive relations are central to the very idea of tacit
knowledge. Although Polanyi postulates an abstract “tacit dimension”, his
writings on the subject locate tacit knowledge by drawing contrasts with ex-
plicit rules, instructions, and plans. And, while Collins also writes abstractly
of a “terrain” on which tacit knowledge can be mapped [TEK], in his early
work on the subject [Collins 1974, 1975], he locates tacit knowledge by refer-
ence to the practical difficulties and polemical contentions attending efforts to
replicate experiments and experimental equipment. In his work on “artificial
experts” [Collins 1990] he locates tacit knowledge by reference to the practi-
cal difficulties with designing artificial intelligence (AI) programs and expert
systems that proponents claim can (or someday will) reproduce embodied and
communicative activities.
Though Collins has rarely acknowledged any indebtedness to eth-
nomethodology (the study of practical actions and practical reasoning in or-
dinary as well as professional circumstances), his procedures for locating tacit
knowledge were not unlike those that Harold Garfinkel had earlier used for
locating what Garfinkel called ad hoc practices in many fields of action within
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and beyond the sciences [Garfinkel 1967]. Difficulties with developing early ma-
chine translation programs, also were a source of insight into the “indexicality”
(the contextual sensitivity and variability of linguistic intelligibility [Bar-Hillel
1954]) that became central to Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology [Garfinkel 1967].
Garfinkel later used the term “instructed actions” to cover relations between
explicit instructions and the situated actions of using them [Garfinkel 2002].
Instructed actions are not simply a kind of tacit knowledge; they involve a
pairing of explicit directions, maps, and other verbal and written formulations
with the practices of using them on particular occasions. Tacit knowledge can
be made relevant in connection with that pairing; consequently, the relational
organizations of instructions to their situated uses provide means (certainly
not the only means) for locating tacit knowledge (i.e., making it practically
relevant). Garfinkel frequently used exercises for his students that required
them to describe their efforts to enact a particular protocol, assemble an ob-
ject from plans, or follow a set of instructions or directions. His aim was not to
train the students to become adept at following instructions; instead, it was to
attune them to the situated difficulties and contingencies that arise when they
attempt to enact plans, act in accord with rules, or follow directions. And,
while he required his students to describe those difficulties and contingencies
in fine detail, the aim of the exercise was not to develop complete descriptions
of tacit knowledge. Instead, the aim was to demonstrate the impossibility of
ever developing complete descriptions in an absolute sense of completeness,
and to encourage the realization that practical standards of completeness are
themselves bound up with relational contingencies. Lucy Suchman’s Plans
and Situated Actions is an innovative and lucid elaboration of Garfinkel’s pro-
cedure for investigating how even the most elaborate plans and instructions
for using novel technologies require users to deploy ad hoc procedures for get-
ting tasks done [Suchman 2007]. Suchman uses insight from her investigations
to critique the determinative role ascribed to explicit plans in AI and related
Silicon Valley belief systems.
According to these procedures, tacit knowledge can be located prospec-
tively or retrospectively, even though it can never be described exhaustively.
Prospectively, rules, recipes, formal instructions, plans, directions, maps, or
protocols implicate unspecified knowledge that enables one to work out just
how to follow them in a future course of action. Retrospectively, tacit knowl-
edge is revealed through the deficiencies of written records for gaining access
to actual work practices. In many cases, tacit knowledge is implicated by a
retrospective-prospective effort to find what explicit instructions are “saying”
in light of interpretative and practical problems and temporal relations that
emerge over the course of efforts to follow them. While, following Collins, we
may simply be inclined to place instructed actions in the category of “rela-
tional” tacit knowledge, to do so is to miss the point of Garfinkel’s exercises:
the situational, interactional, and temporal relations that arise in the course of
the practices of instructed action constitute the very relevance of tacit knowl-
edge [TEK]. As Garfinkel’s students discovered when performing an exercise to
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follow directions for getting from a starting point to a destination in a city, the
difficulties and contingencies they encountered were particular and mundane:
they did not enter a “dimension” of tacit knowledge, instead they ran into a
stream of difficulties during their ongoing attempts to reconcile the sketchy de-
tails of their directions with the unfamiliar and overwhelmingly dense “lived”
course of the journey. The fact that the directions, when read in isolation from
the journey, did not tell the students just what they needed to know in order
to follow them successfully, might seem to implicate a qualitatively different
kind of knowledge that enabled such success. But, when investigated in detail,
the knowledge in question appeared to be commonplace, mundane, and tied to
familiar situations and routines. This knowledge did not make up a coherent
cognitive dimension or terrain; instead, it was an assemblage of ecologically
embedded judgments, actions, and improvisations that were performed along
the course of the unfolding journey. Garfinkel preferred the heading “instructed
actions” to cover these various practical maneuvers and reactions. He did not
contrast a tacit dimension to the explicit knowledge embodied in rules, writ-
ten instructions, recipes, and other formal devices. Instead, he pointed to the
way such formal devices were constituents of instructed actions; they were not
causes of such actions, but instead were tools used in the course of them.
In all of these cases, instructed actions are located in the relationship
between an explicit rule, directive, instruction, formula, or report, and a par-
ticular course of actions that makes use of a rule prescriptively as a guide-
line and/or retrospectively as a source of evidence, or as a basis for crit-
icizing or justifying the actions taken. This relationship is not limited to
an analogy between, for example, explicit rules and “rules” that are tacitly
followed. In such cases, rules, formulated instructions, and plans are not
analogies for another kind of knowledge; instead, they feature concretely in
practices, where they are tools rather than exhaustive representations of the
actions in which they are used. In such cases, what is not formulated in rules,
plans, and so forth, often can be described in detail, but the details are highly
particular—tied to singular situations, local histories, ongoing relationships,
and personal idiosyncrasies. An analyst can generalize about these particulars,
but they are “tacit” by virtue of their particularity in reference to generalized
accounts and instructions.
2 A continuum or Cartesian divide?
In his investigations of tacit knowledge, dating back to the mid-1970s, Collins,
like Polanyi before him, deploys a contrast with various forms of “explicit”
knowledge to define what tacit knowledge is not. In his recent book on the
subject, he goes much further than Polanyi to develop an entire cosmology in
which “strings” (including but not limited to the sequence of code in a digi-
tal program) provide the material and causal basis for transmitting “explicit”
knowledge and programs of action. His argument locates tacit knowledge
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through a process of elimination: if a practice or domain of knowledge can
be encoded and transmitted by a string of words, signs, or electronic pulses,
then it is not tacit. He also develops a taxonomy of various orders of tacit
knowledge and reserves the most central place in his scheme for “collective”
tacit knowledge.
Unlike Hubert Dreyfus, for whom the concept of tacit knowledge is among
the various philosophical resources that he uses to make the case for what
computer programs “can’t do” [Dreyfus 1979, 1992], Collins in his recent work
uses what computer programs (or, more generally, abstract strings of “instruc-
tions”) cannot possibly encode and transmit as a way to define tacit knowl-
edge. This analytical strategy differs from the procedure described earlier for
locating tacit knowledge by describing the contingencies that arise during ef-
forts to follow instructions and rules (a methodological strategy that Collins
himself used in his early work). Instead of providing detailed historical or
ethnographic descriptions of actions that necessarily go beyond what available
rules and instructions specify, Collins now deploys a strategy for considering
and classifying a series of candidate types of tacit knowledge. In this scheme,
when a candidate type of knowledge or action can be made explicit, it no
longer counts as deeply and irrevocably “tacit”—it is tacit only as a matter of
happenstance. His categories of tacit knowledge are thus ordered according to
their “strength” at resisting eventual re-allocation to the “explicit” side of the
ledger. The general category of somatic skill is more difficult to explicate, and
the core category of socially founded knowledge defies the very possibility of
explication in a foreseeable future in his version of tacit knowledge.
Collins faces a formidable challenge in his attempt to specify types of
knowledge that are beyond explication in any foreseeable future. He recognizes
that there is no possibility of drawing a bright line between tacit and explicit
knowledge, but he nevertheless insists upon a “Cartesian” distinction, however
fuzzy at the margins, that demarcates core tacit knowledge from whatever can
be reduced to the effects of digital codes, genetic sequences, and other materi-
al/semiotic “strings”. Although Collins has a running debate with Dreyfus, like
Dreyfus he tries to indicate what cannot possibly (or, at least, foreseeably) be
expressed in human or machine languages, regardless of whether the relevant
expressions take the form of written or oral instructions conveyed from expert
to novice, or algorithms designed to “instruct” a computer to play chess, recog-
nize a face, or convert speech to writing. Both Collins and Dreyfus recognize
that computer programs are now able to model, perform, or simulate far more
than what was possible decades ago when Dreyfus initiated his critique of
AI’s ambitions. However, as Dreyfus argued with a memorable line, to claim
that incremental advances in computer programs support the idea that there
is no essential limit to the potential expansion of programmed systems into
previously unfathomed domains of human conduct, is like saying that “the
first man to climb a tree could claim tangible progress toward reaching the
moon” [Dreyfus 1992, 100]. However, as early critics of Dreyfus were keen to
point out [Pappert 1968], a reciprocal difficulty attends the effort to define a
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boundary between what can or cannot ever be explicated through instructions
or programs.
The debate about what machines can or cannot do is complicated by the
fact that the computers, calculators, printers, and typewriters that now bear
names that once were used for human job titles neither simulate nor dupli-
cate the actions of the humans they put out of work, any more than an au-
tomobile duplicates or simulates the actions and capacities of a horse. By
and large, efforts to develop novel information and communication technolo-
gies seek novelty (just enough to warrant a favorable decision by a patent
examiner), without concern for simulating or duplicating how humans think
or act [Voskuhl 2004]. Such technological innovations have little bearing on
debates about a possible qualitative limit to what can ever be explicated in
a foreseeable future. From the pragmatic point of view of many engineers,
the question of whether their innovations will ever run up against an essen-
tial barrier to explication is a “philosophical” question that can be deferred
for as long as there is the immediate promise of incremental success in the
effort to design technologies that do jobs differently from the way humans do
(or once did) such jobs.
Changes in communicative technologies (and not just computer programs)
reconfigure instructed actions and challenge any effort to draw stable distinc-
tions between explicit and tacit knowledge. Consider the example of recipes.
As noted earlier, one way to locate tacit knowledge is through a contrast be-
tween explicit instructions and immediate efforts to follow those instructions.
Sometimes, though not always, a written text is treated as the prototype of
explicit knowledge. In the case of a written recipe, there are well-known prob-
lems. The recipe calls for one type of cooking oil, and we only have another
type. It is vague in its description of many practical details, and it fails even
to mention many practical requirements, perhaps because the recipe writer
assumed that some practices should be elementary for virtually anyone who
would set foot in a kitchen. By closely examining a novice’s difficulties, we
are bound to find that many situations occur that the recipe fails to mention
or anticipate, and that a mastery of the recipe can only be gained through
repeated practice and hands-on instruction.
But now consider the difference between a cookbook and an online video
or televised cooking show. The video can demonstrate “tricks” that are glossed
over in written recipes, such as how to hold or manipulate a particular utensil,
what “stir vigorously” might look like, and so forth. The voice-over instructions
can be closely coordinated with the visible demonstration of the sequence of
actions. Much can be shown as well as said. An effort to enact what the video
instructs may present its own problems, and moving quickly from one online
version to another of the “same” recipe can be a source of confusion. However,
what turns out to be “explicit” and “tacit” varies with the media through which
the instructions are conveyed. When a video is used to supplement a written
recipe, it seems that the explicit materials have now incorporated at least part
of what the written recipe failed to specify.
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Now consider an interactive forum, such as an online exchange or hotline
[Lynch 2002, 208 ff.]. These forums have the advantage of allowing users to
raise questions geared to singular problems that arise in the course of an at-
tempt to follow particular kinds of recipe. Again, while such forums present
their own limitations, they also occupy an intermediate position between a
written recipe and a hands-on tutorial. Such communication technologies me-
diate the user’s relation to the portrayed practice in a different way than a
written recipe. Each case differently configures just what is explicit and just
what is unstated. What is made explicit, and how it is made explicit, recip-
rocally defines, and is defined by, what is presumed to be tacit. Above all, a
consideration of such cases allows us to see that the very meaning of “explicit”
(and, by implication, “tacit”) is not at all clear.
Collins proposes a “Cartesian” discontinuity between explicit (programmed
and programmable) knowledge and a core domain of collective (human) tacit
knowledge. Proponents of “Strong AI” such as Paul and Patricia Churchland
propose the opposite [Churchland & Churchland 1990]: that there is no essen-
tial divide between the two domains. However, there is no dispute on either
side over the fact that there is continuity at the margins, and that new commu-
nication and information technologies can convert or translate previously tacit
knowledge into novel modes of explicit instruction. For the most part, the AI
debate is about the ultimate possibility of making tacit knowledge explicit,
and marginal cases are of interest mainly as bases for extrapolating what the
current state of the art might or might not promise for the future. For different
reasons, I shall stay at the margins to examine what Wittgenstein called “inter-
mediate cases”—cases at the margins of Cartesian distinctions [Wittgenstein
1953, § 122]—while remaining non-committal about any essential differences
between tacit and explicit knowledge.
The AI debate imposes an artificial condition upon discussions of tacit
knowledge—the condition being the possibility of total explication of a human
practice, so that a machine can do the practice, as though on its own and with
no residue of tacit knowledge needed to complete what the machine leaves
undone. The debate narrows the focus of those, like Collins and Dreyfus, who
rise to the challenge of specifying that and how tacit knowledge cannot ever be
articulated in the way a program would require. Their charge is indifferent to
knowledge that is “tacit” in the sense of being unspoken, implicit, not openly
expressed, but capable of enunciation. There can be many reasons for why
such knowledge is not enunciated besides an essential inability to formulate it
[Cambrosio & Keating 1988, 246]. One, apparently clear, example of such a
marginal case is secret knowledge.
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3 Secret knowledge: What tacit knowledge
is almost not
As noted earlier, Collins highlights the role of “collective” tacit knowledge as
his core ideal type [TEK], while assigning weaker or lesser status to other
categories of “relational” tacit knowledge. One of the categories he consigns to
the margin is “secret” knowledge. This category includes knowledge that can be
made explicit, but which is deliberately withheld or concealed [TEK, 91]. Such
knowledge is relational, because the extent to which it is explicit or concealed
is selective, often strategic, and related to circumstances. Collins adds that
there is no “deep” philosophical puzzle about such knowledge. In the remainder
of this essay, I will argue that the category of (possibly) concealed knowledge
is “deeper” and more interesting than Collins lets on. Moreover, ambiguities
about what is truly tacit (or essentially incommunicable) and about what may
or may not be deliberately withheld or disguised, can be of strong interest for
historical and sociological investigations, as well as for philosophical analyses
and political conflicts.
In principle, secret, deliberately concealed, or undisclosed knowledge is
potentially explicit knowledge that just happens to be withheld from some
potential recipients on some occasions. A person who keeps a secret knows
more than she tells, but not necessarily more than she can tell. To be more
precise, we need to distinguish between two possible senses of the word “can”
in this formulation (Collins distinguishes no less than eight senses of “cannot”
[TEK, 84]). One sense has to do with interpersonal situations, interactional
norms, and local agreements: a speaker might say, “I can’t tell you” to a
particular person from whom she is keeping a secret, but this doesn’t mean
that she is unable to tell it to anyone else. Another sense of “can” and “cannot”
has to do with the very possibility of articulating what remains unsaid. When
Polanyi says that “we can know more that we can tell” [Polanyi 2009, 4],
he makes clear that what we cannot tell is incapable of being articulated to
anyone, and it remains beyond the reach even of the solicitations of a skilled
psychoanalyst, interrogator, or torturer. Such knowledge is not simply tacit—
in the sense of being understood but withheld—it is incommunicable.
The distinction between secret and incommunicable knowledge becomes
more complicated when we recall that efforts to conceal knowledge frequently
involve strategies for concealing that such knowledge is being concealed. For
example, pretexts and alibis used by intelligence agencies when they conduct
covert operations not only enable “plausible deniability”, they forestall suspi-
cion by deflecting attention away from the fact of concealment. In contrast to
Polanyi’s line about “the observance of a set of rules which are not known as
such to the person following them”, covert agents conceal a set of practices from
being evident, as such, to an outside observer. Even when an outside investiga-
tor is convinced that particular agents are concealing or disguising what they
easily could articulate if they chose to do so, it can be dauntingly difficult to
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expose their secrets or even that they are withholding secrets [Lynch & Bogen
1996]. Even in less politically charged circumstances, a group of agents may
present a public front that systematically conceals their own understandings
of what they are doing, on the assumption that outsiders would be prone to
misunderstand and disrupt the actual practices if they were revealed to them
[Hilgartner 1990]. Even during an earnest attempt to instruct a novice, an in-
structor may withhold understandings of the practice that the novice cannot
possibly “absorb” without getting confused and discouraged. An expression,
such as “you don’t need to know” is exquisitely ambiguous—it may hint at
a dark secret, or simply mark that a more complex or subtle understanding
is being deferred until the novice has sufficient competence to grasp it. In
such contexts, ambiguities between what Collins classifies as relational and
non-relational categories of tacit knowledge become strategically useful.
In situations of labor conflict, workers use (and are suspected of using) tech-
niques for holding productive capacity in reserve in a way that is not visible to
managerial or administrative authorities. Secrecy in this sense is not a matter
of withholding specific statements. It is a more elaborate art of complying with
formal requirements, and masking the extent to which such requirements are
undermined in practice. A classic example is a phenomenon that Frederick
Winslow Taylor dubbed “soldiering” among workers in a steel plant [Taylor
1911]. “Soldiering” was his term for the collective guild-like maintenance of a
barrier between insiders’ and outsiders’ (and, specifically, managers’) knowl-
edge of their work-practices (playing off of Collins’s terminology, we could say
that it is an instance of “collective tacit metaknowledge”). Taylor suspected
that workers under his supervision were conspiring to reduce the pace of work
while maintaining the appearance of high productivity.
For Taylor, the tacit knowledge of manual workers offered a practical chal-
lenge to his efforts to manage labor and improve its efficiency. Initially, he
faced a seamless alliance between workers’ secrecy and their possession of tacit
skills, and he aimed to break the workers’ “soldiering” in order to formalize,
standardize, and control the labor process. Taylor designed his program in
scientific management in order to wrest control of the pace of work from the
laborers, so that it could be managed and optimized by the industrial engi-
neers [Braverman 1974, 64 ff.]. His challenge was to devise a way to make
explicit what workers hid from his view through their “soldiering”. Taylor did
not aim to describe the workers’ practices; instead, he sought to reconfigure
those practices by changing the incentives to reward individual productivity at
the expense of worker solidarity. He also developed schemes for measuring and
regimenting embodied motions that previously had been left to the workers’
discretion. His method was not simply an effort to duplicate, or even simu-
late, the workers’ practices; rather, it became a means to bypass, supplement,
and rationalize their practices. Taylor’s notion of “soldiering” assumed that the
workers’ practices were tacit only because they were collectively concealed, and
yet they appeared to an outsider to be indistinguishable from the embodied
skills and collectively cultivated craft knowledge that a non-practitioner would
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be unable to grasp. Taylor’s use of slow-motion film and his system of time-
and-motion study produced an intervention that (in his view) revealed what
the workers concealed, though in Braverman’s critical view the intervention
reconfigured the labor practice and systematically destroyed the communal
solidarity that supported it [Braverman 1974].
“Soldiering” strategically deploys the difference between an insider’s and
an outsider’s perspectives on a practice. Another practice used in labor con-
flicts that also deploys that difference, though in an inverted way, is “working
to rule”. Workers, such as air traffic controllers, have used this practice to
slow down production during labor actions. It is a kind of strike, but instead
of leaving the job, workers conspicuously follow all of the formal protocols
and safety rules that, ordinarily, they would bypass with informal shortcuts in
order to maintain the workflow. It seems likely that, even when conducting
a “work to rule” operation, the workers do not simply “follow the rules”, since
they would still need to deploy their informal know-how in order to perform
situated tasks. Consequently, as in cases of “soldiering”, the pace can be slowed
surreptitiously while an ostentatious effort is made to adhere to formal pro-
tocols. In both scenarios, tacit knowledge has an ambiguous and contentious
role. Not only do the opposing parties in such conflicts hold contrary assump-
tions about what is or is not concealed, as opposed to deeply embedded in the
individual skills and collective form of life of the workers, the ambiguity is a
substantive and strategic constituent of the “relational” situation.
4 Tacit knowledge as a rhetorical theme and
professional resource
In addition to being an attractive theme and explanatory resource for philoso-
phers and social scientists, tacit knowledge and other themes related to it are
vernacular idioms. As is the case for so many other keywords in philosophy
and social science, analytical uses of the term have an ambiguous and confus-
ing relationship to ordinary, situated vocabularies [Mills 1940], [Winch 1958].
A prime source of confusion has to do with the way ordinary words such as
“skill” and “knowledge” are terms of praise as well as analytical concepts. In
many situations, skill and knowledge are valued as possessions of persons and
professions, and as such they are commodities that can command a high price
and provide the basis for privilege, authority, and esteem. The concept of tacit
knowledge aids and abets such authority. Professions that lay claim to tacit
knowledge, not only reserve it as a source of expertise, they also imply that
others cannot possess or even fully comprehend it without first undergoing
a lengthy apprenticeship—an apprenticeship that is controlled by the profes-
sion. As long as relevant non-professionals assume that the tacit knowledge is
legitimate, they must trust what the experts say because they have no basis
for evaluating it themselves. The lack of public transparency associated with
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expert knowledge has long been viewed as a problem for evaluating expert
evidence in public forums such as jury trials [Hand 1901]. This property of
tacit knowledge also presents an analytical problem for those like Collins who
take a realist position toward expertise [Collins & Evans 2007]. In practical
situations, the reality of tacit knowledge can be difficult to establish. This
difficulty is not just a methodological challenge for a sociological study of tacit
knowledge, it is a sociological phenomenon in its own right—and, moreover, it
constitutes social relations as well as reflects them. Indeed, how the claimed
reality of tacit knowledge plays out may be more interesting sociologically than
the “fact” of whether tacit knowledge is or is not “real” in a particular case.
Polanyi, Collins, and others who have written on the topic of tacit knowl-
edge express great respect for its role in the acquisition of technical authority.
Polanyi, especially, treats tacit knowledge as a basis for opposition to central-
ized efforts to “manage” scientific production [Polanyi 2009]. Unlike Frederick
Winslow Taylor, Polanyi lines up on the side of the workers (in this case, a more
highly-educated and privileged class of worker than Taylor’s factory hands),
and he invokes tacit knowledge in support of their autonomy and authority.
Like prominent contemporaries of his, whose arguments also supported the au-
tonomy of science [Merton 1942], [Bush 1945], Polanyi stresses that autonomy
pays off, not only for the scientists who are granted authority over their enter-
prise, but also for the society as a whole which benefits from the innovations
that emerge from free scientific inquiry. Others have suggested that the idea
that public outlays for scientific research should be combined with a hands-off
policy toward how the public funds are spent is a highly convenient ideology for
the profession [Mulkay 1976], [Gieryn 1999]. In that light, Polanyi’s arguments
about the autonomy of science can be viewed as an expression of a professional
ideology. Polanyi was a chemist when not moonlighting as a philosopher of
science, and in many ways his writings express strong commitment and admi-
ration for the craft, integrity and “connoisseurship” associated with the best
scientific work. Though laudable in many respects, Polanyi’s (and increasingly,
Collins’s) orientation to tacit knowledge in the sciences is what sociologists of
scientific knowledge call “asymmetric” [Bloor 1976]. To understand what such
a treatment implies, I will give two examples of a “symmetrical” treatment of
tacit knowledge in medicine.
In an article on the theme of “incommunicable knowledge” in late 19th cen-
tury British medicine, historian of medicine Christopher Lawrence describes
efforts by Victorian gentlemen-doctors to resist the introduction of diagnostic
instruments such as the sphygmomanometer and the stethoscope [Lawrence
1985]. Fearful that these items of equipment would open up the more elite
ranks of the medical profession to mere specialists, the gentlemen-doctors em-
phasized the “incommunicable knowledge” necessary to perform the bedside
work of examining the patient’s pulse, heart rate, and blood pressure. In ad-
dition to referring to the cumulative embodied knowledge that comes with
long experience, the physicians mentioned the refined nerves and sensibilities
of men raised in the gentle classes.
At the Margins of Tacit Knowledge 69
To defend the autonomy of clinical medicine, these physicians in-
voked an epistemology of individual experience which, by defi-
nition, defied analysis. A similar distrust of applied science, an
approval of craft skills and the praise of rule-of-thumb practice,
can be found in the language of many other contemporary pro-
fessions, such as chemistry or engineering. But, in medicine the
account of the nature of clinical skill was linked to other things. It
was used to show that only the gentleman, broadly educated, and
soundly read in the classics, could be equipped for the practice of
medicine. [Lawrence 1985, 505]
Lawrence makes clear that the autonomy of the medical profession was at
stake, and the Victorian physicians’ stress on the importance of experience,
cultivated sensibilities and intuitive judgment, was as much a defensive rhetoric
and professional ideology, as it was evidence for a tacit dimension that resisted
efforts to convert it to mere technical routines.
Warwick Anderson discusses a more recent clash in ongoing efforts to
turn clinical medicine into a science [Anderson 1992]. More explicitly than
Lawrence, he also relates the case to themes in social studies of science. The
episode he describes took place in Australian Hospitals in the early 1970s,
and involved a computerized diagnostic system (a precursor to evidence-based
medicine). Like Lawrence’s Victorian physicians, Anderson’s clinicians per-
ceived the new “scientific” technology as a threat to their authority, and they
resisted it by stressing the “artisanal” and “craft” knowledge cultivated through
bedside practice. After having characterized the two sides in this contest,
Anderson proposes to treat
[...] the “craft” and “scientific” representations of diagnosis sym-
metrically, as discursive resources used in a hospital context to
legitimate the divergent competences of the two occupational sub-
groups. [...] I do not intend to engage in the attempt to establish
whether medical diagnosis is indeed, as the traditional physicians
argued, inarticulable in principle and practice: rather, what I do
hope to show is that it served their interests to represent their
work as such. [Anderson 1992, 655]
The diagnostic system that billed itself as “scientific” was computerized, but
it was not an attempt to represent human clinical judgment. Like Taylor’s
method, it was designed to replace and improve upon, rather than to repro-
duce, the clinician’s diagnostic methods. Anderson goes on to describe a clash
between the competing “rhetorics” and “grammars” of clinical diagnosis, and
he makes clear that how the discourse played out was a tangible constituent
of the social-historical organization and re-organization of clinical practice.
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Conclusion
Lawrence’s and Anderson’s treatments of “incommunicable knowledge” and
“clinical craft” produce a kind of gestalt switch on a realist treatment of tacit
knowledge. Instead of treating physicians’ accounts as evidence of a resilient
type of tacit knowledge that strongly resists rationalization, Lawrence and
Anderson treat those accounts as rhetorical efforts to secure authority in spe-
cific historical labor conflicts (for related cases in other fields, see [Gieryn 1999],
and [Doing 2004]). Their analytical approach requires a detachment that is
difficult to attain (or even to want to attain) in an academic profession that
values autonomy and resists ubiquitous efforts to manage it.
Although Polanyi’s and Collins’s arguments are aligned with other efforts
to support and defend the autonomy of particular professions in the face of
real or imagined administrative encroachments, their realist treatments of tacit
knowledge miss an important phenomenon: they fail to take account of how
that concept and other concepts akin to it are used to claim and allocate
authority and thus to constitute domains of expertise in contested situations.
Collins is forthright in pursuing a programmatic effort to demarcate legitimate
instances of expert knowledge from their Doppelganger (the various pseudo
“theories” and dubious forms of skepticism that vie for public attention in the
“marketplace of ideas”) [Collins & Evans 2007]. In line with that ambition, it
is possible that he will come up with a set of “social” criteria for demarcat-
ing legitimate tacit knowledge from its rhetorical doubles. However, even if
we grant the possibility that he may succeed in that endeavor (a possibility
that I doubt), the point of this paper is not to prove that Collins is wrong,
but to suggest that Lawrence’s social-historical investigation, and Anderson’s
social-anthropological analysis provide alternatives to Collins’s efforts to con-
struct conceptual typologies. The point I have made is a very simple one:
tacit knowledge (along with its close cousins incommunicable knowledge, craft
knowledge, etc.) is, first of all, a vernacular concept; a concept or theme that
is used to do rhetorical work in concerted efforts to manage work and to resist
such management. Consequently, one way to study tacit knowledge is to ex-
amine how it is used as a tool for constituting epistemic and political authority
in particular historical conflicts. We might go so far as to say that this is an
empirical sociological alternative to Collins’s ideological project.
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